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NOTES
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
Conscientious objection to war has been brought sharply into
focus by the publicity afforded the Vietnam war. Conscientious objec-
tion to war is nothing new nor even a product of the recent past. It
has been a recognized fact in the United States since pre-Revolution-
ary War days. In 1757 Quakers refused to pay taxes that would be
used to support the French and Indian War,' and they would not take
part in the American Revolution.2 In 1789 James Madison pro-
posed a Bill of Rights which would include exemption from the
military for conscientious objectors, but the First Congress of the
United States did not adopt the proposal s despite the fact that in
1775 the First Continental Congress had resolved to protect the
right of conscientious objection.4  The matter of conscientious
objection was left largely to the individual states until the Civil
War, 5 when Congressional Legislation provided that conscientious
objectors be considered non-combatants only.6
The Selective Service Act of 19171 provided an exemption for
conscientious objectors8 which required membership in
• . .[A]ny well recognized religious sect or organi-
zation at present organized and existing . . . and whose
existing creed or principles forbid its members to partici-
pate in war in any form. . . .1 (emphasis added.)
The scope of the exemption, as can be readily seen, was intended
to be very narrow.
1. CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA St (L. Schlissel ed. 1968).
2. Id. at 41.
3. Id.at 45.
4. Maddocks, Legal and Constitutional Issues Regarding Conscientious Objectors,
DLALOGUE ON THE DRAFT, REPORT OF THE NATIOxAL OONFERENCE ON THE DRAFT 39 (1966).
5. Id.
6. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ob. 13 § 17, 13 Stat. 6 at 9.
7. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15 4, 40 Stat. 76 at 78.
8. Id.
9. Id,
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The Selective Service Act of 1940 '0 contained less-confining
words. It no longer required membership in a well-recognized
"peace" church. The exemption now applied to one ". . . who, by
reason of religious training and belief," is conscientiously opposed
to participation in war in any form. -1 2 (emphasis added).
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in
United States v. Bowles13:
The 1917 Draft Act required membership on the part of a
conscientious objector in a well-recognized religious sect
whose existing creed or principles forbade its members to
participate in war in any form if he was to obtain exemption
from combatant service. The present act, however, does
not require such membership on the part of a conscientious
objector seeking classification as such.14
The Selective Service Act of 1948, section 6(j) 15 dealt with
conscientious objection and was worded the same as the 1940 Act,
but added the following clarifying words:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but does not include, essentially political, sociological, or
philosphical views or a merely personal moral code."6
The Selective Service Act of 196717 is worded virtually the
same as the 1948 Act. Although the words have changed to
some degree in each succeeding Act, and although it seems that
Congress has broadened the scope, in fact, the result of the change
in wording had little effect on those applying for conscientious
objector status, until the case of United States v. Seeger,", dis-
cussed below.
The duty to bear arms in defense of country has, evidently,
a necessary importance in the world in which we live. The right
to be able to live within one's conscience also should have a neces-
sary importance. Occasionally, a conflict of the two arises together
in the same individual, and the duty and the right naturally oppose
each other. For many, this opposition can be overcome in favor
of duty; for others, it cannot.
10. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720 § 5(g), 54 Stat. 8S5 at 889.
1. 1d. Sec also. George vs. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952) for discussion
of problems of defining "religious training or belief".
1.* Act of S,-pt. 16, 1940, ch. 720 § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885 at 889.
13. lnited St:ites v. 3owles, 131 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1942).
14. 131 F.2d 1,, (:.d Cir. 1942). Sec also United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703,
70S (2d Cir. 1943); United States v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
15. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625 § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 at 612.
16. Id.
17. S1 Stat. l0 § 6(j) (1967).
IS. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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This country, through Congress, has recognized that many
people cannot compromise their conscience, and has chosen to
respect this obedience to conscience, by an exemption in its draft
laws, called "conscientious objection." Although few people have
come within the scope of this classification throughout the greater
part of our country's history, the recent past has brought a gradual
expansion of the scope of the classification.
Can one be a loyal citizen and yet refuse to bear arms in a
war? The answer seems to be "yes." While the following three
cases do not deal directly with conscientious objector classifications,
they involve people and principles and reasonings that run closely
parallel with cases concerning conscientious objector status, and
point out the change in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
duty to bear arms in relation to loyalty, citizenship, and freedom.
In 1929 the Supreme Court upheld the denial of a petition for
citizenship made by a Hungarian diplomat-pacifist because she
refused to swear that she would bear arms in defense of this
country.19 Similarly, in 1931 a petition for citizenship was denied
a Canadian minister who made the qualifying statement that he
would not bear arms in defense of this country unless he believed
the war to be morally justified.2 0 In 1946 the Supreme Court heard
the case of Girouard v. United States.2 1 A Canadian Seventh-Day
Adventist applied for citizenship, stating he would enter the Army
as a non-combatant but would not bear arms. The lower courts had
denied his petition. The Supreme Court overruled Schwimmer and
Macintosh, and granted citizenship saying that the oath of allegience
aliens are required to take does not contain a promise to bear arms2 2
and to so find is to read the promise in by implication.2 3 The
Court pointed out that citizens could get conscientious objector
status and still be loyal to their country, 24 that one with similar
religious convictions would not be barred from becoming a member
of Congress or from holding public office,2 5 and that Congress
could not have intended that one must give up his religious con-
victions to become a citizen, but need not do so to hold public office.26
Possibly the charge in thought evidenced by the holding in the
Girouard case led to the Supreme Court's expansion of the scope
of qualification for conscientious objector status as it interpreted
the various clauses of the Draft Acts dealing with conscientious
objector exemptions.
19. United States v. Sehwirnmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
20. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
21. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
22. Id. at 64.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 65.
26. Id. at 66.
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Although the meanings of other clauses have been expanded,
the courts do consistently require good evidence that the petitioner
is sincere. For example, in United States v. Witmer2 7 the Supreme
Court upheld denial of conscientious objector classification to Witmer
because of lack of sincerity on his part. The Court felt that there
was sufficient evidence of this lack of sincerity in that Witmer had
first tried to be exempted as a farmer, and then as a minister.
After failing in these two attempts, Witmer then applied for a con-
scientious objector exemption.
As noted previously, conscientious objector status was, at first,
granted only to members of a few recognized "peace" churches.2 8
Congress eliminated this requirement in the 1940 Draft Act. The
courts then operated under the words "religious training and be-
lief ' 2 9 as used in the 1940, 1948, and 1967 Acts. Congress attempted
to define this phrase in the 1948 Act, 30 but the Courts have had to
struggle with this phrase ever since.
In United States v. Downer31 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals sustained conscientious objector status for the defendant
saying his humanitarian opposition to war, though not based on
any church membership, was essentially religious in character.
Three years later the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals strictly inter-
preted "religion" in United States v. Berman,3 2 denying con-
scientious objector status to a humanitarian whose lack of belief
in a deity did not, the court felt, meet the requirements for such
classification. This problem will be returned to later.
Chronologically, the next phrase to deal with is "war in any
form." In United States v. Hartman"3 petitioner was appealing
denial of conscientious objector classification. The reason for the
denial was the lower court's strict interpretation of the "war in
any form" clause. Petitioner had stated he would fight to defend
his life, or his family, or in a theocratic war. Petitioner pointed
out that a theocratic war did not involve the use of carnal weapons
and would only be fought on a command from Jehovah. The Court
held that it was not Congressional intent to include theocratic wars
within the meaning of "war in any form," and reversed the lower
court decision. It has been similarly held that a conscientious ob-
jector classification cannot be denied simply because petitioner
would fight to defend his home, 34 and kill if necessary.3 5
27. United States v. Witmer, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
28. These churchs include Quakers and Seventh-Day Adventists.
29. George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1952).
30. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625 § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 at 612.
31. United States v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
32. United States v. Berman, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946).
33. United States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366, 370 (2d Cir. 1954). See also, Taffs v.
United States, 208 F.2d 329, 330 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Sicurrella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385
(1955).
34. Shepherd v. United States, 217 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1954).
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In 1965 the Supreme Court delivered a landmark decision on
the meaning of "religious training or belief" in United States v.
Seeger.36 Prior to this case a belief in a -Supreme Being was gen-
erally required as the motivation for conscientious opposition to
participation in war. Without this belief, no conscientious objector
status was to be granted. In Seeger the Supreme Court stated that
the words "religious training or belief" were used by Congress to
distinguish and exclude essentially sociological, political, or philo-
sophical views. The Court stated this test:
. . . the test of belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being"
is whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful oc-
cupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel
position in the lives of their respective holders we cannot
say that one is "in a relation to a Supreme Being" and the
other is not.87
Seeger had not stated a belief in a Supreme Being as the basis
of his conscientious objection, and for basically this reason the
classification had been denied.
On the basis of this "parallel position" and the fact that Seeger
had not, disavowed any belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being,"''
the Court found for Seeger, giving this guideline:
Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject
beliefs because they consider them "incomprehensible."
Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his
own scheme of things, religious. 39
It is interesting to note that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in 1943 had held for a conscientious objector on basically the same
reasons in United States v. Downer.40 Also, in 1945 the same court
in United States v. BadtV1 held that a conscientious objector class-
ification could be granted if a registrant's opposition to war was
based on humanitarian considerations, rather than an obligation
to a deity or supreme power.
After Seeger the courts began to use the "parallel position"
in the life of the registrant as the basis for granting a conscientious
35. United States v. Lauing, 221 F.2d 425 (7th Mr. 1955).
36. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
37. Id. at 165, 166.
38. Id. at 187.
39. Id. at 184, 185.
40. 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cr. 1943).
41. United States v. Badt, 152 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1945).
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objector classification.42 In United States v. Prince 3 the District
Court for Maine held that a registrant could not be denied
the classification because he did not believe in a "traditional God"
or was not a member of an organized church or religious sect. In
United States v. Vlasits4" the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a draft registrant who did not currently consider himself a
member of a formal religious organization, but asserted that his
religious training contributed to his humanistic philosophy and be-
liefs, and that any participation by him in war would violate such
principles, was entitled to classification as a conscientious objector.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Broyles' 5
found a prima facie entitlement to conscientious objector class-
ification was established by defendant's claim that he saw a "life
force" as a supreme force and human life as sacred, and also by
a showing of a practice of this belief by his work in certain or-
ganizations. Once this prima facie case was established the local
board had stated no good reason for denial of the classification.
Seeger was a big breakthrough for those who did not believe
in a Supreme Being, yet were conscientiously opposed to war. But,
there was still another expansion to come. In Seeger the Court had
stated that the words "religious training and belief" were used by
Congress ". . . to exclude essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views."4 6 This is no doubt in reference to the words
of the Selective Service Act of 1948 section 6 (j), " . . but does not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or
a merely personal moral code."'4 7 An indication that courts have
adhered to these words is found in United States v. BermanW8 where
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said that the use of the word
"religion" was not intended by Congress to include morals, or devo-
tion to human welfare or to a policy of government.4 9 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Kauten5 0 which had
in the same year held for the petitioner in United States v. Downer5'
stated that a conviction that war was inexpedient or disastrous was
not a sufficient basis for a conscientious objector classification, 52
and found against Kauten. In United States v. Lewis53 a Negro had
been convicted for refusing induction into the Armed Forces. He
42. See United States V. White, 421 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1969); Pitcher v. Laird, 421
F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1970).
43. United States v. Prince, 310 F.Supp. 1161 (S.D.Me. 1970).
44. United States v. Vlasits, 422 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1970).
45. United States v. Broyles, 423 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir. 1970).
46. 380 U.S at 165.
47. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625 § 6(J), 62 Stat. 604 at 613.
48. Berman v. U.S., 156 F.2d 377, 380 (9th Cir. 1946).
49. 156 F.2d 377 at 380 (9th Cir. 1946); See also, Sorenson v. Williams, 207 F.Supp.
184 (E. D. Pa. 1962); United States v. Delime, 223 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1955).
50. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
51. 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
52. 133 F.2d at 708.
53. United States v. Lewis, 275 F.Supp. 1013 (E.D. Wis. 1967).
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said that he could not conscientiously serve in the Armed Forces
of a nation whose laws and customs did not afford him the same
-opportunities that whites were given. The U. S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin felt that defendant was making
a frivolous claim and therefore was not acting in good faith. The
conviction was affirmed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Fleming v. United States54 reversed a conviction of defendant for
refusing induction. The court said defendant had made a prima
facie case of qualification for a conscientious objector classification
and could not be denied it even though defendant's reasons were
based primarily on political, sociological convictions, or a merely
personal moral code. These must be the sole reasons 55 before a
denial can be made. Here there was also evidence that defendant
had been influenced by religious training and belief in a Supreme
Being.56 Similarly in United States v. Levy, 57 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals said that a personal moral code was not the sole
basis for defendant's conscientious objection, even though it was
the primary reason. Defendant's conscientious objection was also
based on at least one belief that came from a force or Supreme
Being, that belief being that he must act according to what he
believes is right and this obligation is greater than an obligation
to secular authorities.5
In Welsh v. United States" the Supreme Court had occasion
to interpret the words "sociological, political, or philolsophical or
a merely personal moral code." Defendant was convicted of re-
fusing induction into the Armed Forces. He claimed a conscientious
objection exemption. The lower courts found no religious basis for
the classification and also that defendant had denied that his views
were religious. The Government claimed defendant's views were
sociological, political, philosophical or a merely personal code. The
Court discussed the exemption in the Selective Service Act of 1967
section 6(j) and said that those intended to be excluded from the
exemption were:
The two groups of registrants that obviously do fall within
these exclusions from the exemption are those whose beliefs
are not deeply held and those whose objection to war does
not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle
but instead rests solely upon considerations of policy, prag-
matism, or expediency. 0
54. Fleming v. United States, $44 F.2d 912 (10th Mr. 1965).
55. Id. at 915.
56. Id. at 916.
57. U.S. v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1969).
58. 419 F.2d at 367. See also, United States v. White, 421 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1969)
Pitcher v. Laird, 421 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1970).
59. Welsh v. United States, 938 U.S. 333 (1970).
60. Id. at 342, 343.
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Thus the Supreme Court has now held, it seems, that along
with insincerity, the only other objections to war which are not
a basis for conscientious objector classification are considerations
uf inconvenience. These seem to be the only reasons left that are
not at least "parallel" to religion. If it seems from the foregoing
that the field of conscientious objection has been opened to its
widest, it should be pointed out that there is yet another expansion
of the qualifications for the classification.
In United States v. Sisson61 the U. S. District Court for Mass-
achusetts reversed a conviction of refusal to submit to induction in
the Armed Forces. Defendant did not come within any definition
of a religious conscientious objector yet claimed he was consci-
entiously opposed to the war in Vietman, and morally opposed to
killing in that war. The Court found that the 1967 Draft Act dis-
criminated between the draft status of Sisson as a conscientious
objector and the draft status of conscientious objectors who were
adherents to certain types of religions.
Basing this discrimination on the "free exercise of religion"
clause of the First Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, the court
said:
Sisson's case being limited to a claim of conscientious
objection to combat service in a foreign campaign, this
court holds that the free exercise of religion clause in the
First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibit the application of the 1967 draft act
to Sisson to require him to render combat service in Vietnam.
The chief reason for reaching this conclusion after ex-
amining the competing interests is the magnitude of Sis-
son's interest in not killing in the Vietnam conflict as
against the want of magnitude in the country's present need
for him to be so employed.6 2
Quoting further from the case:
• . . Congress has not provided a conscientious objector
status for a person whose claim is admittedly not formally
religious.
In this situation Sisson claims . . . the Constitution does
preclude Congress from drafting him under the 1967 Act.
The reason is that this Act grants conscientious objector
status solely to religious conscientious objectors but not to
non-religious objectors.
This Court, therefore, concludes that in granting to the
religious conscientious objector but not to Sisson a special
Conscientious objector status, the Act, as applied to Sisson,
61. United States V. Sisson, 297 F.Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
62. Id. at 910.
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violates the provision of the First Amendment that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
'6 3
• . . [T]his Court decides . . . that as a sincere con-
scientious objector Sisson cannot constitutionally be sub-
jected to military orders . . . which may require him to
kill in the Vietnam conflict.
6 4
And elsewhere in the case the Court said:
The sincerely conscientious man, whose principles flow
from reflection, education, practice, sensitivity to competing
claims, and a search for a meaningful life, always brings
impressive credentials. When he honestly believes that he
will act wrongly if he kills, his claim obviously has great
magnitude. That magnitude is not appreciably lessened if
his belief relates not to war in general, but to a particular
war or to a particular type of war. Indeed a selective con-
scientious objector might reflect a more discriminating
study of the problem, a more sensitive conscience, and a
deeper spiritual understanding. 5
rhis reference to "selective" conscientious objection is further
expanded in United States v. McFadden.6 6 The U. S. District Court
for the Northern District of California held that a statute exempting
from military service only those persons whose religious beliefs
forbid them to participate in war in any form placed such a burden
upon religious beliefs of a Catholic selective objector, who believed
the war in Vietnam was an unjust war, as to violate the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment.6 7 Since no compelling
state interest exists justifying invidious discrimination against
Catholic selective objectors who believe the Vietnam war is an
unjust war, the statute requiring opposition to "war in any form"
violates equal protection and due process of law, 68 and also violates
the First Amendment's mandate against establishment of religion.69
In United States v. Berg70 the U. S. District Court for the Southern
District of Maine held for the defendant, a Catholic, who distin-
guished between a "just" war and an "unjust" war. The defendant
said that the conditions for a "just" war cannot be met under the
conditions of contemporary warfare. The Court held that on the
basis of this reasoning, defendant's belief that all wars are now
63. Id.
64. Id. at 912.
65. Id. at 908.
66. United States v. McFadden, 309 F.Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
67. Id. at 506.
68. Id. at 508.
69. Id.
70. United States v. Berg, 310 F.Supp. 1157 (S.D. Me. 1970).
71. Id.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
"unjust" was sufficient basis for granting a conscientious objector
classification.71
Once upon a time one had to be a member of an established
religion that forbade killing and participation in war, and believe
in an orthodox God, and be opposed to war in any form, in order
to be classified a conscientious objector. Now one can be granted
that classification even though he does not believe in God or a
Supreme Being, is not a member of any religious organization, is
opposed to war on personal moral grounds, or is only opposed to a
particular war, as long as that opposition is not based on reasons
of inconvenience or grounds of expediency, policy, or pragmatism.
The author welcomes this trend of expanding the scope of the
conscientious objector, classification. Like the expansions in other
areas of the criminal law, this one further protects the rights of the
individual. These individual rights have been steadily shrinking in
our society, and could evaporate completely. Such a situation
would be sorely felt by all of us, no matter what our political views
are at present. Therefore, any step that restores individual rights
to any degree, is a step in the right direction.
HENRY F. ROMPAGE
